Category Archives for Education

We Analyzed 7 Of The Fastest-Growing Personal Finance Apps Of All Time To Figure Out The Secrets To Their Success — Here’s What We Learned

Millennials will inherit the largest amount of personal wealth of any generation — and personal finance apps are emerging to seize on this opportunity. Here are the core strategies that these companies are using to build, convert, engage, and monetize their audience.

Source: We Analyzed 7 Of The Fastest-Growing Personal Finance Apps Of All Time To Figure Out The Secrets To Their Success — Here’s What We Learned

Love & Beauty 101 . . . and other Quirky Quotes

Everything ought to be beautiful in a human being: face, and dress, and soul, and ideas.” —Anton Chekhov

“Beauty of whatever kind, in its supreme development, invariably excites the sensitive soul to tears. ”
— Edgar Allan Poe

We fly to beauty as an asylum from the terrors of finite nature. Emerson, Journals, 1836.

Beauty is a primeval phenomenon, which itself never makes its appearance, but the reflection of which is visible in a thousand different utterances of the creative mind, and is as various as nature herself. – Goethe, quoted in Johann Peter Eckermann’s Conversations with Goethe, April 18, 1827.

“For I conclude that the enemy is not lipstick, but guilt itself; that we deserve lipstick, if we want it, and free speech; we deserve to be sexual and serious–or whatever we please; we are entitled to wear cowboy boots to our own revolution.” -Naomi Wolf, The Beauty Myth

“People see you as an object, not a person, and they project a set of expectations onto you. People who don’t have it think beauty is a blessing, but actually it sets you apart.” -Candace Bergen

“The Rubicans which women must cross, the sex barriers which they must breach, are ultimately those that exist in their own minds.” -Freda Adler

“Obesity in a woman violates conventional sexuality not only through association with self-absorption and auto-eroticism but also because largeness [is equated with] masculinity.” -Marcia Millman, Such a Pretty Face

“Let me listen to me and not to them.” -Gertrude Stein

“Its hard to fight an enemy who has outposts in your head.” -Sally Kempton

” It is not easy to become beautiful. It requires hard work, patience, and attention to detail. It also takes a certain firmness of purpose. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and it may be necessary from time to time to give a stupid or misinformed beholder a black eye.” -Miss Piggy

“Yesterday I dared to struggle. Today I dare to win.” -Bernadette Devlin

To love is to suffer. To avoid suffering one must not love. But then one suffers from not loving. Therefore, to love is to suffer; not to love is to suffer; to suffer is to suffer. To be happy is to love. To be happy, then, is to suffer, but suffering makes one unhappy. Therefore, to be happy one must love or love to suffer or suffer from too much happiness. Woody Allen

Among those whom I like or admire, I can find no common denominator, but among those whom I love, I can: all of them make me laugh. W. H. Auden

Nothing takes the taste out of peanut butter quite like unrequited love. Charlie Brown

You have to walk carefully in the beginning of love; the running across fields into your lover’s arms can only come later when you’re sure they won’t laugh if you trip. Jonathan Carroll, “Outside the Dog Museum”

Absence is to love what wind is to fire; it extinguishes the small, it enkindles the great. Comte DeBussy-Rabutin

Gravitation is not responsible for people falling in love. Albert Einstein

No, this trick wont work…How on earth are you ever going to explain in terms of chemistry and physics so important a biological phenomenon as first love? Albert Einstein

There are very few people who are not ashamed of having been in love when they no longer love each other. Francois, Duc de La Rouchefoucald

Love is the only way to grasp another human being in the innermost core of his personality. Victor Frankel

Love is an irresistable desire to be irresistably desired. Robert Frost

A man in love is incomplete until he is married. Then he’s finished. Zsa Zsa Gabor

Love is not blind — it sees more, not less. But because it sees more, it is willing to see less. Rabbi Julins Gordon

Love is a hole in the heart. Ben Hecht

Love is like pi — natural, irrational, and very important. Lisa Hoffman

People think love is an emotion. Love is good sense. Ken Kesey

AP Explains: What Is Net Neutrality and Why Does It Matter?

NEW YORK (AP) — “Net neutrality” regulations, designed to prevent internet service providers like Verizon, AT&T, Comcast and Charter from favoring some sites and apps over others, are on the chopping block. On Thursday, the Federal Communications Commissio

Source: AP Explains: What Is Net Neutrality and Why Does It Matter?

Why Chinua Achebe is one of the world’s most important modern writers

The late Nigerian author Chinua Achebe has been honoured in a Google Doodle, underscoring his status as a towering figure of 20th century literature. By creating a doodle marking what would have been Achebe’s 87th birthday, the tech giant is celebrating a writer many consider to be father of modern African literature.

Source: Why Chinua Achebe is one of the world’s most important modern writers

George Campbell Peery Bryd: Regular and Depression Governor

  • by Dr. Joseph A. Fry History Dept – University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The emergence of a new generation of party leaders was crucial to Harry F. Byrd’s rise to power. As a charter member of the Byrd organization, George Campbell Peery personified this new Democratic elite – loyal, self-effacing, and conservative. Not merely representative, Peery also contributed significantly to the evolution of the organization and to Byrd’s career. His dramatic victory in the Ninth Congressional District in 1922 augmented Byrd’s growing reputation as a political organizer, and his overwhelming triumph in the Democratic gubernatorial primary of 1933 sealed Byrd’s unquestioned control over the party.

As governor from 1934 through 1938, Peery provided steady, conservative leadership that continued Byrd’s philosophy and programs, reinforced Byrd’s opposition to the New Deal, and allowed the new senator the freedom to shift much of his attention to national affairs.

Of Scotch-Irish descent, Peery was born in Cedar Bluff, a Tazewell County hamlet, in 1873. His father, James Peery, had served the Confederacy as a surgeon with Derrick’s Battalion. While attending local schools, George worked on his father’s farm, clerked in the family store, and at the age of sixteen did clerical chores in the Tazewell County clerk’s office. His father’s successful medical practice enabled him to enroll in Emory and Henry College in the depression-ridden 1890s. An able, hard-driving student, Peery demonstrated diverse abilities by winning medals in oratory and science.

Following graduation in 1894 he became principal of Tazewell High School but resigned two years later to enter the Washington and Lee University School of Law. Taking his studies seriously, he maintained a Ninety-plus average and earned his degree in one year. After practicing law in Tazewell for two years, Peery crossed the mountains to Wise. Although he expected a short stay, legal work with several coal and land companies went well, and he soon built the largest house in town, a structure of nearly twenty rooms.

In 1907 he married Nancy Bane Gillespie, the daughter of Albert P. Gillespie, a prominent Tazewell attorney. From this long happy marriage came three children. Although Peery concentrated on his legal career in Wise, he gained valuable experience in public life and earned the respect of prominent local Democrats, many of whom later emerged as staunch supporters.

In 1915 Peery returned to Tazewell as executor of Albert Gillespie’s estate and soon joined Gillespie’s former law partners, A.C. Buchanan and Archibald C. Chapman, to form the firm of Chapman, Peery, and Buchanan.

In 1916 he was chosen as state Democratic elector-at-large on the Wilson- Marshall ticket; four years later he was tapped as both a delegate to the party’s national convention and as chairman of the Ninth District Democratic Committee. Modest and retiring, Peery elicited the confidence of his political peers, and his penchant for meticulous and effective organization endeared him to both Democratic workers and candidates. By the eve of the 1921 gubernatorial election he had constructed what some considered the “best organization” in district history. E. Lee Trinkle confirmed this evaluation by becoming the first Democrat to carry the Ninth in twenty years. The “Fighting Ninth,” composed of the city of Bristol and the thirteen mountainous counties of southwestern Virginia, was a Republican stronghold.

The man most responsible for Grand Old Party dominance after 1900 was C. Bascom Slemp. First as campaign manager for his father, Campbell Slemp, and thereafter on his own behalf, the “Sage of Turkey Cove” had skillfully marshaled Republican forces and scratched out hard-fought victories to each congressional election from 1902 through 1920. Encouraged by Peery’s effective organization, Trinkle’s impressive showing, and Republican economic difficulties on the national level, local Democrats enthusiastically prepared to battle the formidable Slemp in 1922.

After a preconvention “conference of active Democrats” had selected Peery as their candidate, nearly six hundred delegates trooped into Bristol on March 21, 1922, for the official convention. John W. Flannagan nominated Peery and set the convention’s tone. The people, he said, had voted for “prosperity, plenty and a full dinner pail,” but got “hell, Harding and hard times.” Amidst a rollicking atmosphere of handkerchief-waving, newly enfranchised women and hat-throwing men, Peery was nominated by acclamation.

In ensuing weeks, Peery and Everett Randolph (“Ebbie”) Combs, his campaign manager and soon-to-be chief of staff of the Byrd organization, compiled lists of Democrats who had not paid their poll taxes. These lists were forwarded to Bristol where party leaders “looked after” the delinquent taxes, prodding party members to register and, on occasion, even dispatching registrars to their homes.
In mid-October Combs smugly and accurately estimated that “we will qualify between two thousand and twenty-five hundred more new voters than they will. Things look mighty good. “Even with these prodigious efforts, the Ninth District Democrats required outside aid. Harry Byrd, then thirty-five, new chairman of the Democratic state central committee, sent state auditors to monitor Republican poll tax payments and later convinced Governor Trinkle to postpone a potentially divisive special session of the legislature until after the November elections.

Byrd provided his most critical contribution, however, by funneling badly needed funds into the district. He personally contributed over $1,000 and also tapped sources ranging from wealthy party supporters in Richmond to Democratic officeholders and state employees. Byrd also became the first state chairman in memory to campaign in the Ninth.

What had promised to be an extremely close contest became a rout when Bascom Slemp unexpectedly refused to seek reelection. John Hassinger, the Republican nominee and a state senator from Abingdon, was no match for Peery, who despite his low-key manner, was a markedly superior speaker and a more energetic campaigner, traveling to all corners of the far-flung district. Emphasizing that he was one of the Southwest’s native “mountain boys” (in contrast to the Pennsylvania-born Hassinger), Peery concentrated on the economic problems that had engulfed the nation under Harding. This cumulative effort yielded a resounding victory, Peery defeating Hassinger by more than 2,900 votes.

Republican power in the Ninth was broken; and like Henry Carter Stuart and E. Lee Trinkle before him, George Peery would discover that the road to the Governor’s Mansion began in the rugged campaign trails of the Southwest. The key to traveling this road without mishap was Peery’s close identification with Harry Byrd, an association which over the next fifteen years proved mutually beneficial. Peery’s victory significantly enhanced Byrd’s political position; more importantly, by initiating lasting friendships with Peery and Combs, Byrd had begun the formation of his own personal organization. In congratulating Peery, Byrd observed prophetically, “I predict for you a wonderful career in Congress, and political honors in the future much greater than that of being a Congressman.”

A large, rawboned man standing nearly six feet two inches tall, the new congressman cut an impressive figure. At forty-nine Peery’s hair was silvering, and his heavy brow and thin mouth framed a sharply chiseled but handsome face. In personal encounters Peery was initially shy, but most acquaintances discovered his boyish smile disguised a genuine “warmth of manner.” Often belittled by political opponents as “Silent George”, Peery was never boisterous and consistently listened more than he talked. However, once he was on the platform his dignified appearance, deep, resonant voice, and subtle, cutting wit surprised many an adversary and impressed numerous audiences.

Strongly attached to the mountains of southwest Virginia, Peery found outdoor recreation satisfying and relaxing. Congressional teas were “a little difficult” and could not compare with riding horses, hunting birds, or pitching horseshoes. Prudent and cautious in his approach to problems, Peery displayed courage and resolution in supporting his views. As a “Bust Head dirt farmer” observed in 1933, “You take the Peery’s and sometimes they can be as stubborn and sot [sic] in their ways as anything, especially when they are right.

“With the aid of Byrd, Combs, and the smoothly functioning district organization, Peery spearheaded successful reelection campaigns in 1924 and 1926. Although he failed to sponsor any noteworthy legislation during three congressional terms, he did advance a conservative economic and political philosophy much attuned to that of Governor Byrd. Peery frequently deplored the plight of farmers; however, his proposed solutions to the agricultural depression looked back to the Populists rather than ahead to the New Deal. Instead of wholesale purchase of surplus crops by the federal government, he recommended the reduction of taxes, freight rates, and tariffs.

Peery sounded much like Byrd himself in endorsing the pay-as-you-go approach to public finance. While debating alternative methods of financing road construction, he declared, “we are getting a splendid highway system in Virginia, and we are doing it without resorting to bond issue.” He declined to seek reelection in 1928 and ended his congressional career in March 1929.

Peery attempted to squelch rumors that he might run for governor by stating in January 1928 that he favored Benjamin F. Buchanan, a Marion Native and the organization’s tentative choice. However, Herbert Hoover’s 1928 success in Virginia (especially in Tidewater) forced Democratic regulars to turn to an eastern man who favored Prohibition but was not too closely tied to the organization.

After surveying the field, Byrd tapped John Garland Pollard, former attorney general and professor of government at the College of William and Mary. This did not, however, end speculation, and on March 26, 1929, Peery declared: “in hope of promoting harmony in the party. . . I do not expect to become a candidate in the approaching primary.” he then joined organization leaders in backing Pollard.

Virginia’s Democratic press roundly applauded Peery’s “patriotic” decision not to risk a sectional split in the party. The Petersburg Progress-Index. predicted that he had put “himself in a strong position as a candidate . . . four years hence.” The Richmond News Leader. agreed that he was “already being looked on by many as the Democratic gubernatorial nominee in 1933.” These predictions proved accurate. Following Pollard’s election in November, Governor Byrd immediately rewarded Peery’s loyalty with appointment to the State Corporation Commission; but his ultimate reward would come four years later.

Not since E. Lee Trinkle had southwestern Virginia supplied the state’s chief executive. It was logical that the organization would look to that region in 1933, and it was equally logical that George Peery would be the choice. Byrd and Peery were virtually of one mind on economic and political policy; moreover, Peery had demonstrated the ability to attract popular support and had exhibited unquestioned loyalty by postponing his gubernatorial aspirations. His credentials were flawless.

Peery’s performance in 1933 was of vital interest to the Byrd organization Initially Byrd supporters agonized over the widening rift between the “old guard” led by Senator Claude A. Swanson and new-generation men led by Byrd. By early 1933 disagreements over federal patronage and Byrd’s ill concealed desire for Swanson’s Senate seat had become the main points of contention. But Swanson avoided a direct confrontation by accepting Franklin Roosevelt’s offer to be secretary of the navy, and Governor Pollard then dutifully appointed Byrd to serve the remainder of his term.

Always wary, the new senator still feared that a weak showing by Peery might generate opposition to his election to a full term in 1934. In January 1933 Byrd decided that Peery should delay his formal campaign at least until mid-March. In the interim, Byrd and Combs would in Combs’s words, “immediately commit as many local political leaders to Peery as possible.”

After this solicitous cultivation of courthouse rings. Peery opened his campaign on April 6 by endorsing the Byrd reforms, which included the short ballot, tax segregation, consolidation of government money, and pay-as-you-go road construction. He also called for increased aid to education, reduction in the automobile license tax, abolition of the fee system wherever possible, and continuation of a balanced budget, which would bring “an earlier return to prosperity.”

Public demand for a reduction of prevailing utility rate unexpectedly produced the first important issue of the campaign. In response to a number of protests, the State Corporation Commission had authorized Allen J. Saville, a prominent Richmond civil engineer, to evaluate the rates of the Virginia Electric and Power Company, the Virginia Public Service Company and the Appalachian Electric Power Company. The companies themselves were to help finance the investigation.

The ensuing controversy quickly enveloped Peery. chairman of the Corporation Commission when the investigation was authorized. Much of the furor originated with T. Ralph Jones of Norfolk, the most vocal member of the League of Virginia Municipalities and a rival candidate for governor. Jones and the league objected to financial involvement of the power companies in the investigation, and Jones denounced both Peery and Saville as decidedly “pro-power and utility.”

Apprehensive over these charges, Byrd moved to defuse the situation and thereby cut all ties to the power companies. Following Byrd’s counsel, Peery refused comment prior to announcing his platform on April 6. he then recommended a prompt valuation of utility company properties as the base for subsequent rate determination and advocated giving the Corporation Commission the power to amend rates temporarily. Much to the relief of the Byrd-Peery camp, this potentially explosive issue faded from view after Jones withdrew from the race on April 29.

Joseph T. Deal and W. Worth Smith now became Peery’s opposition. Deal, a Norfolk businessman, had represented Virginia’s Second District in Congress from 1921 through 1929. Smith, who (according to the Times Dispatch.) was one of Louisa County’s “most eminent possum hunters,” had served in the state Senate since 1924. Both men proclaimed themselves New Dealers and harshly castigated Peery for his association with the Byrd “machine.” Deal was especially vehement in his antiorganization stand, demanding the repeal of the short ballot and tax segregation, which he characterized as transparent devices to “perpetuate” organization control. Defeating Peery, Deal proclaimed, would be the key to ridding Virginia of Byrd’s “officeholders trust.”

Peery proud of his organization ties, quickly pointed out that both of his opponents previously had supported the allegedly evil machine and dismissed Deal’s demand for the decentralization of state government as “reactionary.” Peery and Byrd had greater difficulty establishing a viable position on Prohibition repeal. The two men had personally and politically favored Prohibition for years, and both of them underestimated the strength of repeal sentiment. Moreover, with the 1928 Democratic split still quite vivid, the organization sought to avoid alienating “drys.”

Byrd advised dodging the Prohibition issue as long as possible, and Peery adopted this strategy. He supported repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, but his policy for Virginia was equivocal. Taking no personal stand, he promised to abide by the wishes of the General Assembly or a popular referendum. When pressure for a special session of the Assembly mounted, the organization sought to get back in step with the electorate.

On June 27, 1933, both Peery and Byrd announced support for a special session to legalize the sale of beer and to establish procedures for acting upon the Eighteenth Amendment and Virginia’s antiliquor laws. Byrd then pressured reluctant Governor Pollard into permitting a special session, and the bogey of Prohibition was eliminated from the campaign. Despite the vehement, at times abusive attacks of his opponents, Peery campaigned with a “dignity and poise” born of his own personality and the confidence of organization support.

Organization tactics had so effectively disposed of troublesome issues that the Times-Dispatch. dismissed the campaign as “colorless” and “listless”. Still, as the August 1 primary date approached, organization insiders fretted over the “size of [Peery’s] majority.” Their anxiety was unwarranted. Peery carried eight of the state’s nine congressional districts and polled 116,837 votes to Deal’s 40,268 and Smith’s 52,318. the transfer of power within the Democratic organization was complete.

With the real contest finished, Peery and the organization virtually ignored the Republicans. Fred McWane, a Lynchburg manufacturer and the Republican candidate, repeatedly challenged Peery to debate; and other GOP representatives scored Peery and the “machine” for Tammany Hall policies” and inconsistency. Peery’s response was to take a leisurely fishing trip and meet with Governor Pollard to discuss the approaching administrative transition.

After a relaxed, one-month campaign, Peery easily defeated McWane, 122,820 to 40,377. Those in Richmond for Peery’s inaugural on January 17, 1934, were greeted by glistening sun and a sharp, chill wind. After the usual formalities including six bands playing “Happy Days Are Here Again,” Peery sounded the dominant theme of his administration: “The one outstanding lesson that has come to all during these critical days is the need for thrift and economy in all lines of endeavor. . . We need economy in government today, as we have never needed it before.”

Having run on the Byrd-Pollard record, Peery interpreted his victory as an endorsement of their conservative policies. Not a reactionary opposing all progress, he believed that the cost of progress had to be confined within a balanced budget. “Financial insecurity on the part of the state,” he lectured, could not promote the permanent “social security” of the people.

Peery’s initial encounter with the General Assembly was stormy. In the special referendum of October 3, 1933, Virginia had voted to repeal both the Eighteenth Amendment and the state Prohibition law, thereby necessitating revision of Virginia liquor laws. Peery recommended a three-man board to issue licenses for the sale of beer and wine, purchase liquors, and establish state-operated liquor stores. This plan made the liquor business a state monopoly limited to carryout sales.

The opposition favored private liquor licensing and sale of liquor by the drink with meals in restaurants and hotels, they argued that Virginia’s tourist trade demanded these innovative steps. Although Peery yielded to the popular demand for repeal, he resolutely defended temperance. “The object of the law,” he pronounced, should be to promote temperance and outlaw the bootlegger and racketeer.”

Successfully resisting pressure for liquor by the drink and private licensing, he also secured an amendment making the buyer of moonshine as guilty as the seller. In June 1938 the three-man Alcoholic Beverage Control Board had established 187 state stores, bootlegging had declined significantly, and the state was realizing a substantial profit from this monopoly. Observers agreed that Peery had staffed the board with excellent appointments and that the new system was working well.

Disagreement over liquor paled by comparison to the reception accorded Peery’s request for increased taxes to fund public education. In his final message Governor Pollard had recommended that the state spend approximately $6 million for public schools over the upcoming biennium, but Peery said this would not fund normal eight-month sessions and called for an additional $1 million for each of these years. To retire a projected $2 million deficit by the end of the same period the state would have to balance its budget and hope for increased revenues.

Simultaneous aid to public schools and a balanced budget necessitated tax increases. Peery’s tax package would increase rates on personal incomes, utility companies’ incomes, and inheritances and would levy new taxes on motion picture tickets and Virginia corporation dividends. Even though Peery sought to offset these increases with a $1.8 million reduction in auto license fees, he encountered stiff opposition. The press was virtually unanimous in its condemnation.

William A. Garrett, eighty-year-old chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, led the antitax forces in the General Assembly. Garrett blandly dismissed Peery’s proposal as a “school teachers’ salary program” and vowed that it would “never pass the Senate.” As this “major revolt” swelled, rumors circulated that Byrd opposed Peery’s program. Byrd had been initially ambivalent; but after talking with Peery and Combs, he advised an associate that “he should support whatever George Peery advocates, and I intend to do the same.”

Byrd then made a special trip to Richmond, meeting with the governor and various legislators. Byrd urged Peery to compromise, especially on taxing corporation dividends. Through personal conferences with organization stalwarts, the senator prepared the Assembly leadership for this move. Byrd also countered the vehement press attacks upon Peery by ordering his two papers, the Winchester Evening Star. and the Harrisonburg New-Record, to insert “several editorials strongly supporting Governor Peery in his efforts for balanced budgets.”

Byrd’s actions were important, but Peery’s were decisive. Skillfully employing the powers of his office and working privately through Combs and T. McCall Frazier, Virginia’s motor vehicle commissioner, he unrelentingly pressured individual legislators. Publicly, he dramatized the issue in a speech before a joint session of the Assembly. After stressing that the tax increases were earmarked only for education, he explained that his proposed reduction in the auto license tax was greater than the cumulative additions in other areas. He then compromised slightly by eliminating taxes upon motion picture tickets and corporation dividends and assuaged urban opposition by altering the school plan to provide greater aid for cities and more populous counties.

As the session ground toward a close, administration spokesmen prodded holdouts by threatening that rejection of Peery’s program might necessitate a sales tax. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Peery delayed signing the alcohol control bill with its substantial patronage features, using it as a lever to swing recalcitrant assemblymen into line. When these combined efforts produced lopsided victories in both houses of the Assembly, even Peery’s most strident critics conceded that he had “routed” the opposition.

A mixture of bitterness and near admiration characterized the News Leader’s final comment on Peery’s action; “The use of force by an administration is common enough, but rarely since 1923. . . has executive force been used with such full-armored, naive audacity.”

The 1934 General Assembly enacted one other significant, though much less controversial, measure – revoking the right of the fee-paid justice of the peace to try cases and replacing him with a salaried official, the trial justice. (Biased decisions had become so prevalent that Virginians commonly referred to the initials “J.P.” as “Judgment for the Plaintiff.”)

The 1934 Trial Justice Act and a second, more comprehensive measure in 1936 established court-appointed trial justices in every county. The trial justice became the principal judicial officer on the local level, and the system has since evolved into the district court. As a practicing attorney, Peery took special pride in this reform, and shortly before his death he characterized it as one of his administration’s most outstanding achievements.

The conclusion of the legislative session brought Peery no respite, for neither he nor the legislature had dealt meaningfully with the social and economic disarray wrought by the Great Depression. Because of its rural character and relatively balanced economy, Virginia had fared better than many states, and economic conditions had steadily improved since 1932; however, recovery was far from complete. The unemployed still numbered over 125,000. From July 1934 through June 1935 Virginia’s relief rolls averaged 208,626, and not until 1937 would the Old Dominion regain its 1930 level of prosperity.

The depression’s ongoing rigors heightened the importance of federal aid. Soon after Peery took office, Harry Hopkins, administrator of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), threatened to terminate Virginia’s relief funds. Hopkins was “very disappointed” that the state had appropriated no funds for direct relief; one of his assistants explained that Virginia had “not carried her fair share” and should provide more money “if she [expected] more from the federal government.”

Extensive appropriations for direct relief were anathema to Peery and the organization. Although sympathetic to the plight of the unemployed, Peery, like Byrd, gave greater priority to maintaining the state’s financial integrity and allegedly to preserving individual character. From Peery’s conservative and elitist perspective, large relief allocations ensured both deficit spending and diminished individual initiative.

Peery would tolerate no deficit spending in Richmond. However, he adamantly contended that if Washington were to indulge in such “folly,” Virginia should receive its “share” of federal bounty. Byrd agreed. Seeking to avert the threatened termination of funds, Byrd arranged a conference with Hopkins which produced an assurance that Virginia would have access to approximately $6 million through February 1935. Hopkins periodically renewed his demands, but they remained only threats as he consistently capitulated to the political power of Senators Glass and Byrd.

This uncertain situation continued essentially unchanged until the summer of 1935 when Roosevelt began phasing out the FERA. As the 1936 session of the General Assembly approached, pressure for greater state appropriations increased. From 1933 through 1935 the FERA had poured over $26 million into Virginia and paid over 90 percent of the state’s relief bill. Without this aid, the state would have to assume greater responsibility.

Public school spokesmen were also demanding larger appropriations. Former Governor E. Lee Trinkle, chairman of the State Board of Education, joined the Virginia Education Association in championing a program requiring an additional $7 million. More funds were also needed for highway construction and maintenance and the new unemployment insurance and old-age pension programs created by the Social Security Act of 1935.

Peery’s first recommendation to the 1936 General Assembly emphasized his resolve to hold the line against spending; Virginia has reaped substantial benefits from the sound financial policies followed in the past and should not be led by insistence demands for increased appropriations to abandon the policy that expenses must not exceed income.” While opposing new taxes, he proposed, nevertheless, an additional $347,935 for public schools, $2 million for direct relief, and approximately $8 million for roads.

Turning to social security, he recommended the adoption of a state unemployment insurance plan since failure to do so would cost Virginia workers millions of dollars in benefits. On the other hand, estimating the annual costs of an old-age pension plan at $2 million to $11 million, he suggested that this matter be postponed for further study. The General Assembly followed Peery’s suggestions with only one exception – it rejected the unemployment insurance plan.

An unidentified state senator succinctly summarized the 1936 session from the administration’s perspective: “We met, we didn’t raise taxes, we balanced the budget, and we adjourned, and it took courage to resist the demands for new projects that would have left a huge deficit.” Others, of a more liberal ilk, pointed to the defeat of unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, an eight-hour labor law for women, probation and jail reform measures, and an antinepotism bill and concluded that this had been the most “reactionary Assembly” since 1920.

Several factors explain the defeat of the administration-sponsored unemployment insurance plan. Many states’ right legislators balked at “dictation” from Washington, and forceful lobbying by the Virginia Manufacturers Association shoved others into the negative column. Although nominally in favor of the bill, Peery demonstrated none of the drive that had forced his proposals through the Assembly in 1934. The Roanoke Times decried the “startling lack of leadership,” and other critics charged that the governor had “laid down” on the bill.

In the months that followed, Peery refused to call a special session to enact the plan. He contended that states without unemployment laws would command a sufficient majority in Congress to extend the December 31, 1936, deadline for parallel state legislation. However, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey dashed Peery’s hopes by indication they would adopt the required laws. But before capitulating, the governor made certain that a majority of the assemblymen favored the proposed plan and would confine their action to the bill and others he might submit.

By soliciting this dual pledge, Peery eliminated the possibility of funding a special session that would again reject the plan or meddle in other matters. Amid grumblings about “Huey Long” tactics, the Assembly met on December 14 and enacted the unemployment insurance plan, which provided for a State Unemployment Compensation Commission to supervise collection of required taxes from the state’s employers. By January 1938 when benefit payments began, the commission had also established an employment service with thirty-three offices through out the state.

Meanwhile, labor unrest created new problems for Peery. After the passage of the Wagner Act and the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (COI), labor activity in 1937 reached new heights of intensity throughout the country. In Virginia there were fifty strikes involving 18,743 workers, both high marks for the decade. The most serious strike occurred at the industrial Rayon Corporation plant in Covington. Union activities at Covington were part of a concerted CIO campaign to organize the southern textile industry.

After enrolling nearly 80 percent of the plant’s 1,000 workers, union representatives initiated negotiations in late February 1937. Among their demands were an end to discrimination against union members, a substantial wage increase, and recognition of the Synthetic Yarn Federation of America (CIO) as the sole representative for collective bargaining. Talks soon reached an impasse.

Suddenly, at 11:30 p.m. on March 29, the workers initiated Virginia’s first major sit-down strike. The company promptly closed the plant, but nearly 400 sit-downers refused to leave. There was no violence. Instead a surprisingly amiable atmosphere prevailed. Union members agreed to clean the machinery, and management consented to keep the plant cafeteria open for their use. But this unnatural spirit of cooperation lasted only a few days.

Property-conscious Virginians, appalled at the newest labor tactic, considered the sit-down a blatantly illegal seizure of company property. Although Peery agreed, he decided against any hasty attempt to evict the strikers. He contended that initial responsibility for the protection of private property rested with local authorities, and his policy of purposeful procrastination paid dividends on April 7, when the rayon workers voluntarily evacuated the plant and established traditional picket lines outside the plant gate.

After a three month battle of attrition, Industrial Rayon challenged the picket line on July 7. Two busses and twenty cars of returning workers clashed with between 400 and 500 strikers. Although the strikers overturned two cars and numerous fistfights ensued, no one was seriously injured. Peery’s reaction contrasted sharply with his reserved response of three months before. Operating on the theory that “strikes are legal, but any man who wishes to return to work certainly has the privilege and right” to do so, he quickly dispatched 25 state policemen to the scene. On July 9, the state troopers escorted 50 workers into the plant; by the thirteenth, 500 workers were back on the job, a month later 850 men were operating the plant at 75 percent capacity. The strike was broken.

Charges arose that the state police had acted as strikebreakers by convoying persons “not in the employ of the Industrial Rayon Corporation” when the strike began. Peery truthfully responded that he had been advised that the groups escorted by the police were all former employees. More fundamentally, Peery, like most Americans, had a narrow view of the strike as a weapon in industrial disputes and was uncomfortable with the concept of an enforced closed shop. This, together with his perceived obligation to maintain peace and order, dictated that the governor’s practical policy would favor management.

On January 12, 1938, Peery made his final appearance before the General Assembly. Undoubtedly speaking for many predecessors, he declared, “I sincerely thank every friend who had any part in bringing to me the greatest honor of my life. No nobler mission can come to any man than that of serving as Governor of this Commonwealth.” Several days later, as he started for Tazewell and a “long rest,” observers noted that “his eyes were moist, his voice husky.” Peery had carefully perpetuated Harry Byrd’s reform program and his conservative economic and political philosophies. He had also presided over several significant innovations including adoption of the alcoholic beverage control plan, passage of unemployment insurance, enactment of the trial justice system, and appropriation of Virginia’s first funds for direct relief.

Like Governors Byrd and Pollard, Peery had pursued a policy of stringent economy. With the aid of increased revenues from the state liquor monopoly and returning prosperity, he converted the 1934 deficit of over $2 million into a projected surplus of over $5 million in 1938. Moreover, Virginia’s bonded indebtedness had decreased from $20,009,535 to $16,866,455. In evaluating his governorship, editorials emphasized such terms as “prudence,” “caution,” “courage,” “candor,” “integrity,” and “conservatism.”

Writing in 1936, Westmoreland Davis, one of the organization’s most strident critics, zeroed in on yet another trait. He acknowledged that Virginia bonds were “selling at a premium” but contended that it had been “accomplished through neglect of the state of its duty to its citizens.” Liberal critics did not have to look far to substantiate this charge. In 1935 twenty-nine states furnished relief aid to the aged, the blind, dependent children, and the unemployed. Fifteen states aided two of these groups. Virginia helped only dependent children.

In his 1936 budget recommendations Peery granted 80 percent ($8 million) of the additional funds requested by the highway department and 5 percent ($350,000) of the new allocations requested by the Department of Education. Virginia’s 1937 expenditures revealed a similar pattern; 35.86 percent for roads, 11.19 percent for education, and 6.19 percent for welfare. this unbending conservatism and devotion to pay-as-you-go had led both Peery and the organization to sacrifice human priorities at the altar of fiscal orthodoxy.

His gubernatorial term completed, Peery returned to southwest Virginia. He resumed his law practice, raised livestock, and served on the boards of trustees for both Hollins College and Washington and Lee University. He rendered his final public service as a delegate to the constitutional convention of May 1945, which abolished the poll tax and registration requirements for persons in the armed forces.

After a period of declining health, George Campbell Peery died on October 1, 1952, and was buried in Maplewood Cemetery in Tazewell. At first glance, Peery seems to have epitomized the typical Byrd organization member – quiet, unassuming, colorless, little more than an interchangeable part. He was certainly one of the most representative members of the organization, and his career clearly demonstrated the loyalty, patience and ability necessary to rise through its ranks. However, a low-key, undramatic style should not obscure significant contributions to Byrd’s rise or Peery’s central role in the evolution of the organization. His victory in the 1922 congressional election launched Byrd on his way, and his victory in the 1933 gubernatorial primary secured Byrd’s control of the party.

Peery’s gubernatorial term was an especially crucial one for Virginia and the organization. His steady, dependable leadership allowed the Byrd forces to regroup and consolidate control after the crisis of 1928-29, and it simultaneously enabled Senator Byrd to assume a more national posture. Lastly, Peery’s term coincided with the century’s most serious economic crisis. His Response mirrored that of the organization, and his administration embodied the philosophical tenets that have dominated twentieth-century Virginia government efficiency, pay-as-you-go, suspicion of national spending, and hostility to the growing federal bureaucracy. In sum, Peery was both a highly representative figure and a substantial contributor to Virginia political history from 1920 through 1938.

Biographical Sources

TAKEN FROM THE PEERY FAMILY WEBSITE – The above is copied from the book on Governors of Virginia found in the Virginia State Library, Richmond VA. Dr. Fry was George Peery’s official biographer as he wrote many more articles about various aspects of his life. Sources at the bottom of the article state that George left no private papers but papers of Harry Flood Byrd, Everett Randolph Combs, and Carter Glass at the University of VA; Reed Family Papers, VA Historical Society; and Peery Executive Papers, VA State Library; all contain material on George Peery.

Principal secondary accounts of Peery’s career include Joseph A Fry, “George Campbell Peery: Conservative Son of Old Virginia” (M.A. thesis, U of VA, 1970); Fry and Brent Tarter, “The Redemption of the Fighting Ninth: The 1922 Congressional Election in the Ninth District of VA and the Origins of the Byrd Organization,” South Atlantic Quarterly 77. (Summer 1978; 352-70; Fry, “The Organization in Control: George Campbell Peery, Governor of VA, 1934-1938,” Va Magazine of History and Biography 82. (1974: 306-30; and Fry, “Rayon, Riot and Repression: The Covington Sit-Down Strike of 1937,” Va Magazine of History and Biography 84. (1976): 3-18.

“Annals of Tazewell County VA” by Harman, p. 529-30 has the following article on George Peery. George Campbell Peery (James, Thomas, Thomas, Thomas), was born October 28, 1873, at Cedar Bluff, in Tazewell County, VA. He graduated from Emory and Henry College in 1894; taught school at Tazewell, Va., for two years; and graduated in law from Washington and Lee University in one year (1897). He began the practice of law at Tazewell, Va. and later removed to Wise, Va. he lived at Wise from 1902 to 1915; and returned to Tazewell in 1915, becoming a member of the law firm of Chapman, Peery & Buchanan.

He was one of the Democratic Electors at Large for the State of Virginia on the Wilson-Marshall Ticket in 1916. He was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention at San Francisco in 1920. His son Albert served as a page in that convention. In 1922, Mr Peery was nominated as the Democratic candidate for Congress from the Ninth District of Virginia, and was elected over John H. Hassinger, Republican. He was re-elected in 1924 over C. Henry Harman, Republican, of Tazewell, Virginia.

On June 19, 1907, Mr Peery married Nancy Bane Gillespie, daughter of Albert P. and Nancy Higginbotham Gillespie. Albert P. Gillespie was a member of the Virginia Constitutional Convention in 1902. Mr and Mrs. Peery are the parents of three children: (1) Albert Gillespie; born September 25, 1908; (2) George Campbell, Jr., born March 27, 1910; and (3) Nancy Letitia, born February 1, 1916.